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February 27, 1990 
Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: State v. Lovegren and Southern, Case No, 890350-CA 
Dear Ms, Noonan: 
I wish to make the following corrections of 
typographical errors that appear in the State's brief filed 
recently in the above-referenced case. 
1. The first sentence on page 17 should read: 
First, the Arroyo Court was far too 
willing to operate on the apparent premise 
that because very few citations for 
"following too closely" are issued, officers 
normally do not stop vehicles for that 
violation when they observe it. 
2. Footnote 7 at page 21 should read: 
While the Court has made clear that the 
state has the burden of showing that there 
was voluntary consent, it has not yet 
specified in a published opinion what 
standard of proof applies to the burden. Cf. 
State v. Marshall, Case No. 890121-CA, slip 
op. at 10-11 (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 26, 1989), 
reh'q pending (which appears to adopt a 
"clear and convincing" standard of proof for 
this inquiry). However, in light of the 
Mary T. Noonan 
February 27, 1990 
Page Two 
United States Supreme Court's decisions in 
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) 
(preponderance of evidence standard 
applicable to determination of voluntariness 
of confession), and United States v. Matlock, 
415 U.S. 164 (1974) ("controlling burden of 
proof at suppression hearings should impose 
no greater burden than proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence"), the 
preponderance of evidence standard appears to 
be the appropriate standard. See 4 La Fave, 
Search and Seizure, § 11.2(c) at 233-37 
(1987) (noting split in courts on question). 
3. The last sentence of Point II on page 22 should 
read: 
If findings of fact and conclusion of law 
are necessary to a determination of the issue 
of Southern's consent, a remand of the case 
for that purpose would be appropriate. Ibid. 
Sincerely, . 
^DXVID B. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Governmental Affairs Division 
DBT:bks 
cc: Thomas H. Means 
Michael D. Esplin 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
V ' ] 
ROBERT D. LOVEGREN, and 
GREGORY WADE SOUTHERN, 
Defendants. 
> APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
| No. 890350-CA 
Category No. 2 
REPLY POINTS 
Appellants, by and through their respective attorneys of 
record, hereby reply to the Brief of Respondent, the State of Utah, 
as follows: 
1. PRESERVATION OF GROUNDS FOR APPEAL 
The State has argued that Appellants failed to properly 
preserve two issues at their suppression hearing so that argument 
on those two grounds at the appellate stage is prohibited, State v 
Carter, 707 P2nd 656, (Utah 1985); State v Johnson, 771 P2nd 326, 
(Utah 1989); State v Schlosser, 774 P2nd 1132, (Utah 1989); State v 
Marshall. 124 Utah Adv Rep 60, (Utah 1989); State v Webb, 131 Utah 
Adv Rep 41, (Utah 1990). Those two issues are 1) whether article I 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution sets forth protections against 
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unreasonable searches and seizures that are more liberal than the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, and 2) whether Appellants were detained for a time 
and purpose beyond the reasonable and necessary scope of the 
initial stop of their automobile, without reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause. 
A. Article I, Section 14, Constitution of Utah 
Appellants concede that only a nominal reference was made to 
the provisions of the Utah Constitution as regards their right to 
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Accordingly, this 
Court's analysis of the stop, detention, and search of the 
Appellants and their car should be based on the assumption that the 
state and federal constitutions afford identical protections. 
Johnson, supra. 
B. Unreasonably extended detention 
While not specifically using the words "defacto arrest" or 
"inordinate detention" counsel for Appellant Southern argued 
extensively that both Appellants were detained long after the 
purpose of the initial stop had been addressed and resolved (see 
transcript of hearing page 83, line 2 to page 84, line 2; also page 
84, lines 18 and 19). Counsel for Appellant Lovegren adopted and 
joined in those arguments (see page 89, line 8). 
2 
Among the points raised were: 1) the citation had already been 
issued, 2) the registration had been verified, 3) the driver's 
license had been checked out, 4) no arrest had been made, 5) the 
officer commenced a search for an unspecified target not connected 
with the alleged traffic stop, 6) the officer searched without 
articulated probable cause or reasonable suspicion. All of these 
points go to the argument that the above-noted actions of the 
officer came after the purposes of the initial stop had been 
addressed, that the officer detained the Appellants beyond the 
reasonable scope of the initial stop, that the officer's actions 
were not related to the initial stop, and that the Appellants were 
therefore detained for a time and purpose that was unnecessary to 
the purpose of the initial stop without articulated reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause. These are the factors noted in United 
States v Guzman. 864 F2nd 1512, (10th Cir. 1988), which address the 
propriety of a post-traffic stop detention. Clearly Appellants 
preserved their argument that they were subjected to a defacto 
arrest. 
C. Preservation of the State's arguments 
Four of the arguments raised by the State in its Brief of 
Respondent were not preserved below. The first two, that Lovegren 
has no standing to argue against the seizure from Southern's pocket 
and that Southern has no standing to argue against the seizure from 
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Lovegren's car or suitcase or cookie box are addresses immediately 
hereinbelow under STANDING, Additionally, in Point II of the Brief 
of Respondent the State argues that the search of Southern's pocket 
can fall under the consent exception to the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment. Similarly in Point III, the State argues that the 
search of Lovegren's trunk and suitcase and cookie box can also be 
founded on consent. However, the State did not argue for a consent 
exception below, either in the case of the search of Southern or in 
the case of the search of Lovegren. This Court should not allow the 
State to argue consent as an exception in either search pursuant to 
the holdings of Carter and Johnson, supra. 
2. STANDING 
In its responsive brief, the State agrees that each appellant 
has standing to challenge the initial stop, but beyond the stop 
"defendants fail to distinguish the very different fourth amendment 
interests each had at stake in this case". Specifically, the State 
asserts that "only defendant Southern has standing to challenge the 
pat-down search of his person" and contrastingly, "beyond his 
'fruit of the poisonous tree' argument which relates to the initial 
stop and the pat-down search of his person by Trooper Rawlinson, 
Southern has no standing to object to the search of the vehicle, 
the suitcase, or the cookie box." 
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Several recent Utah cases have addressed the standing 
issue related to challenges to searches and seizures from 
automobiles. All cite Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128 (1978) for the 
proposition that a proponent of suppression must have had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the locale searched in order 
to challenge a seizure from that locale. See State v Valdez, 689 
P2nd 1334, (Utah, 1984), State v Constantino, 732 P2nd 125, (Utah 
1987) ; State v Larocco, 742 P2nd 89, (Utah 1989) ; State v DeAlo, 
748 P2nd 194, (Utah 1987); State v Greuber, 776 P2nd 70, (Utah 
1989). 
However, the issue critical to the claim raised in the 
responsive brief is the question of who has the burden of going 
forward with standing arguments at the trial/suppression hearing 
setting. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that in challenges to 
searches and seizures, standing is a substantive and not a 
jurisdictional doctrine. Schlosser, supra. The Supreme Court 
reasoned that because the doctrine is substantive, the State's 
challenge to standing was waived because it was not raised either 
below or on appeal (Associate Chief Justice Howe had raised the 
issue, sua sponte, in his Dissent). The Utah Court of Appeals faced 
a similar situation when the State raised a standing argument on 
appeal that had not been raised at trial. Marshall, supra. There, 
the Court declined to distinguish Marshall from Schlosser, ruling 
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that the standing challenge was waived when not raised at the trial 
level explaining that the rule was "fashioned to protect the 
defendant from being required to deal with new legal issues on 
appeal when he had no warning of the necessity to develop the 
relevant facts below." The Court cited Steagald v United States, 
451 US 204, (1981) as authority for the ruling. The thrust of these 
decisions is that the State shoulders the burden of going forward 
with any standing challenge and that failure to raise the issue 
below constitutes waiver of the argument. 
In this matter, the precise standing argument raised in the 
State's Brief of Respondent is that Appellant Lovegren does not 
have standing to challenge a seizure from within Appellant 
Southern's pocket (Lovegren had no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in Southern's pocket) and that Appellant Southern has no 
standing to challenge a seizure from within Appellant's 
car/suitcase/cookie box (Southern had no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in Lovegren's car/suitcase/cookie box). 
At the suppression hearing below, the State's only argument 
that touched on standing was a disclaimer theory. See Transcript of 
Suppression Hearing, page 81, line 6 to page 82, line 1 and page 
91, line 19 to page 92, lie 5. Below, the State's attorney 
consistently couched his "standing" argument in terms of defendants 
having jointly denied ownership of the items in the trunk. In 
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arguing this point, the State's attorney used the words 
"defendants", "[b]oth of them", "we", "they lost their privacy 
expectations", "they had no reasonable expectation of privacy", 
"they disclaimed", "they didn't know where the key was". 
The argument proposed by the State's attorney at the hearing 
below did not differentiate one of the Appellant's legitimate 
expectations of privacy from the other Appellant's nor "distinguish 
the very different fourth amendment interests each had at stake in 
this case" as the State now seeks to argue for the first time on 
appeal. Under the rulings of Schlosser and Marshall, as well as 
Carter, Johnson, and Webb, the State should be prevented from 
arguing that Lovegren cannot challenge the seizure from Southern's 
pocket and that Southern cannot challenge the seizure from 
Lovegren's car/suitcase/cookie box by reason of the waiver of these 
precise arguments. Appellants should be protected from facing new 
legal issues on appeal and each should be allowed to argue for 
suppression of all items seized from all locales. 
Further, since the State has chosen not to argue the 
disclaimer theory proposed below, by implication the State concedes 
that Appellant Lovegren did not waive his standing to challenge the 
search of the car, trunk, suitcase, and cookie box. Nevertheless, 
it should be noted that the "standing" argument raised below (that 
neither Appellant has standing to challenge a seizure from within 
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the suitcase because they jointly disclaimed ownership of it) also 
fails for additional reasons. 
First, Appellant Lovegren did assert ownership and a privacy 
interest in the cookie box which contained the cocaine. See 
Transcript of Suppression Hearing page 23, line 1 to page 24, line 
5. Consequently, if the Appellants did initially disclaim ownership 
of the items in the trunk, Lovegren (who did have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in his suitcase and its contents) ultimately 
withdrew or cured the disclaimer by his assertion of a privacy 
interest in the cookie box. 
Second, the Utah cases of Constantino and DeAlo each stress 
that the respective defendants in those cases failed in their 
assertions of standing because each failed to testify or otherwise 
present evidence of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Similarly, 
in Marshall, the Court emphasized that had the defendant been 
alerted to the State's disclaimer argument, "[tjhe defendant may 
well have chosen to testify at the motion to suppress hearing to 
contradict the trooper's testimony that he had disclaimed ownership 
...." (Emphasis added.) Each of these cases emphasizes that to 
prevail on a claim of a legitimate expectation of privacy, a 
defendant must assert the claim at the suppression hearing or 
trial. Thus, while a disclaimer made at the scene of a search may 
constitute some evidence of abandonment, it does not necessarily 
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constitute a waiver of a privacy interest, and certainly does not 
in this factual setting, as was argued by the State below, 
3. PRETEXTUAL NATURE OF THE INITIAL STOP 
Below, and in its responsive brief, the State has countered 
Appellants' argument that the initial stop of their car was a 
pretext to investigate other suspected criminal activity. The State 
further suggests that State v Arroyo, 770 P2nd 153, (Utah 1989), 
has been cited by Appellants for the proposition that it "can be 
read as concluding that stopping vehicles for 'following too 
closely' is not a general practice, ..." in Utah police agencies. 
However, while Appellant's don't refute that argument, that was not 
the reason for the reference to Arroyo. Rather, Appellants have 
cited Arroyo and State v Sierra, 754 P2nd 978, (Utah 1988) for the 
argument that, under any circumstances, the Court has determined 
that the focus is on whether a reasonable officer would have made 
the stop, " [t]he proper inquiry does not focus on whether the 
officer could validly have made the stop." Sierra, supra. This is 
the same focus stressed in other decisions by this and other 
courts. See State v Smith. 781 P2nd 879, (Utah 1989) ; Marshall, 
supra; Schlosser, supra; Guzman, supra. 
In this case, while the officer arguably could have validly 
stopped the vehicle for following too closely, the evidence 
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presented did not establish that a hypothetical reasonable officer 
would have done so where, as here, the traffic violation occurred 
over a relatively short period of time, it occurred as both cars 
were slowing for an off-ramp and after the lead car had slowed 
resulting in the Lovegren vehicle being "caught behind" it, no 
vehicles were put in jeopardy, traffic was light and was not 
impeded, endangered or otherwise affected, and no other violations 
were noted prior to the officer's decision to make the stop. See 
Transcript of Suppression Hearing, page 4, line 3 to page 6, line 
17; page 29, line 5 to page 33, line 10; page 50, line 52 to page 
53, line 5. 
While the State made a case that the trooper could have 
stopped the car, it simply did not present facts that would 
establish that a reasonable officer would have found it necessary 
to make a stop under the circumstances. 
... And in making that assessment it is imperative 
that the facts be judged against an objective standard; 
would the facts available to the officer at the moment of 
the seizure warrant an officer of reasonable caution and 
belief that the action taken was appropriate? Scott v 
United States, 436 US 128, (1978). 
4. INORDINATE DETENTION / DEFACTO ARREST 
As noted hereinabove, the State is inaccurate in asserting 
that Appellants did not raise the issue of their de facto arrest 
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below. Except for that preservation-of-grounds argument, the State 
has not argued either at the suppression hearing or on appeal that 
the extended detention was reasonably related in duration or 
purpose to the reason for the initial stop or otherwise 
appropriate. "In order to justify a defendant's continued 
detention, an officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the 
stopped vehicle is carrying contraband or that a detained defendant 
has committed a crime." Guzman, supra (citing Florida v Royer, 460 
US 491, (1983). Assuming the stop was constitutional, the following 
detention must be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 
which justified the interference in the first place." Terry v Ohio, 
392 US 1 (1968). "An officer conducting a routine traffic stop may 
request a driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer 
check, and issue a citation." Guzman, supra (citing United States y 
Gonzales, 763 F2nd 1127, (10th Cir. 1985) and United States y 
Recalde. 761 F2nd 1448, (10th Cir. 1985). 
When the driver has produced a valid license and 
proof that he is entitled to operate the car, he must be 
allowed to proceed on his way, without being subjected to 
further delay by police for additional questioning. In 
order to justify "a temporary detention for questioning," 
the officer must also have reasonable suspicion "of 
illegal transactions in drugs or of any other serious 
crime." Guzman, supra. 
Unlike the facts cited in Marshall, in which this Court denied 
a claim of an unreasonable post-stop detention, after resolving the 
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purpose of the initial stop, Officer Rawlinson did not "immediately 
[ask] for permission to look into the vehicle ..." In this case, 
after checking for license and registration and issuing a warning 
citation, Trooper Rawlinson continued to question the driver about 
the route and purpose of his trip, the names of the people he had 
visited, the name of the lake he had visited, then asked the 
passenger for a driver's license, and asked for permission to look 
into the interior of the vehicle. After finding nothing 
incriminating in the search of the interior, he asked the driver 
"what he was on?" (While the officer testified he detained 
Appellants because he felt they may have been under the influence, 
he conducted no field tests of the driver but focused on the 
passenger and the car.) He then asked where their luggage was, how 
long they had been on their trip, and whether there was anything in 
the trunk. He then asked the driver if he could look in the trunk. 
According to the trooper, he was told "yes" but that there was no 
key. He then asked if either had weapons and was told "no". Next, 
he conducted a pat-down of the passenger, removed keys from his 
pocket, and asked whose keys they were. When the passenger answered 
that he didn't know the trooper suggested that they probably fit 
Appellants' car. All of this occurred before the trunk was opened 
and the search of its interior conducted. See Transcript of 
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Suppression Hearing, page 10, line 10 to page 19, line 11; page 53, 
line 6 to page 56, line 15. 
Clearly this trooper did not quickly and directly seek 
permission to look into the trunk immediately after concluding his 
investigation of the reason for the initial stop, as did the 
trooper in Marshall. Rather, Trooper Rawlinson continued to detain 
Appellants while sequentially searching and prodding for 
information not related to the initial stop. As such he went beyond 
the justification or scope of the initial intrusion. The fruits of 
the illegal detention should be suppressed because "[w]hen police 
purposely effect an illegal arrest or detention in the hope that 
the custodial interrogation will yield incriminating statements or 
evidence, the deterrence rationale for application of the 
exclusionary rule is especially compelling.11 Brown v Illinois, 422 
US 590, (1975). 
Because the State does not challenge Appellantfs argument that 
the inordinate extended detention of Lovegren and Southern was 
unrelated to and unnecessary for the purposes of the initial 
traffic stop and because by a standard of the totality of the 
circumstances Trooper Rawlinson1s detention of appellants beyond 
the needs of the initiual intrusion was in fact unreasonable and 
without articulated reasonable suspicion, it should be held that 
any seizures come at by reason of such unreasonable detension 
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should have been suppressed. Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471, 
(1963); Brown, supra. 
5. SEIZURE OF KEY FROM SOUTHERN'S POCKET 
A. Reasonable suspicion for pat-down 
The State correctly argues that a pat-down search of the outer 
clothing of an individual may be made when there is articulated 
reasonable suspicion that the subject is armed and dangerous. The 
State further argues that, while the reasons for the pat-down 
search in this case is a "close question" it is sustainable 
because: 1) each defendant had bloodshot eyes, 2) the car had empty 
beer cans in it, 3) the interior was dirty, 4) the passenger 
admitted to drinking a six-pack, and 5) defendants were nervous. 
Interestingly, the State points to no articulated suspicion that 
Southern was either armed or dangerous and the trooper did not 
testify as to any reasonable suspicion to justify the pat-down. 
While this Court has ruled that "[t]he officer is entitled to asses 
the facts in light of his experience," State v Truiillo, 739 P2nd 
85, (Utah, 1987), State v Sery, 758 P2nd 935, (Utah, 1988), it has 
also held that "the officer must be able to articulate what it is 
about those facts which leads to an inference of criminal activity. 
If the officer fails or is unable to do so, his suspicion is 
classed as a mere 'hunch1 rather than an articulable suspicion. 
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State v Menke, 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, (Utah, 1990); United States v 
Sokolow, 109 S.Ct. 1581, (1989). The justification for a "Terry" 
pat-down is judged by a two pronged test: perception and 
articulation. Since the trooper failed to articulate reasonable 
suspicion, this pat-down failed the second prong. 
B. Seizure of the key 
The State does not contest that, assuming the pat-down was 
justified, the keys were not subject to seizure as they were 
neither a weapon, contraband, or fruits of a crime, United States v 
Place, 462 US 696, (1983); Florida v Royer, supra; Adams v 
Williams, 407 US 143, (1972). 
C. Consent to the pat-down search 
The State has asserted that, as an alternative to reasonable 
suspicion for the pat-down, Appellant Southern consented to the 
pat-down. The trooper testified, "... I had them let me pat down 
their pockets." See Transcript of Suppression Hearing, page 18, 
line 1. This brief statement does not indicate a request and a 
voluntary consent or acquiescence that will pass existing standards 
of review. 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that 
the consent was "unequivocal and specific" and freely and 
intelligently given; (2) the government must prove 
consent was given without duress or coercion, express or 
implied; and (3) the courts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights and there must be convincing 
evidence that such rights were waived. Marshall, supra 
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citing United States v Abbott, 546 F2nd 883, (10th Cir. 
1977). 
Consent must be determined "from the totality of the 
circumstances." Schneckloth v Bustemonte, 412 US 218 (1973). "The 
scope of the search is limited by the breadth of the actual consent 
itself ... Any police activity that transcends the actual scope of 
the consent given encroaches on the Fourth Amendment rights of the 
suspect." United States v Gay, 774 F2nd 368, (10th Cir. 1985). 
Appellant Southern testified "[the trooper] said, 'Do you care 
if I pat you down?1 I said, 'No'." He was further asked, "So you 
never gave him consent to look inside your pockets?" He answered, 
"No sir." See Transcript of Suppression Hearing, page 64, line 18 
and page 65, lines 5 to 7. Reasonably presuming against a waiver, 
the totality of the circumstances of the stop, the detention, and 
the limited scope of the consent (if any) do not establish 
convincingly that Southern unequivocally and specifically consented 
to a search of the interior of his pocket, free of implied duress 
or coercion. 
There was no reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat-down of 
Souther; the keys were not subject to seizure, at any rate; it 
cannot be reasonably concluded that the State presented evidence 
from which the trial Court could reasonably conclude that Southern 
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consented to a search of the interior of his pockets; the key 
should have been suppressed. 
6 LOVEGREN'S CONSENT TO A SEARCH OF THE TRUNK/SUITCASE/COOKIE BOX 
Appellants1 initial brief states in detail why, in the 
total i ty < : f the ei rcumstances, -he tri al court erred in concluding 
that the trooper was given Lovegren's consent to search the trunk 
and the suitcase. Appellants have further set forth hereinabove the 
three pronged Abbott test for judging the voluntariness of a 
claimed consent and urge that an application of that test to the 
testimony adduced at the suppressior 1 hearing would not convincingly 
indicate clearly and positively that unequivocal and specific 
consent was granted by Lovegren, free of implied or express duress 
or • ::oerc:i on i n 1 ight of every reasonable presumption against a 
waiver of the fundamental constitutional right. 
The State has argued that "[Lovegren's] actions, taken as a 
whole, were justifiably interpreted by the officer and the trial 
court as consent to a search of everything in the suitcase.11 
Interestingly, unlike counsel for the State, neither the trooper 
nor the trial court felt Lovegren's consent extended to the cookie 
box. The officer testified on cross-examination as follows: 
Q ... Did you ask who owned the cookie box? 
A No. 
Q You didn't ask for permission to open the cookie box? 
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A Didn't specifically ask him if I could look in the cookie 
box. Transcript of Suppression Hearing, page 57, line 16 to line 
22. 
Similarly, the trial court found that Lovegren consented to a 
search of the trunk and suitcase but not the cookie box: 
It is the ruling of this court that he has the right 
to make a pat down search and concern himself with 
whether or not what he felt was a weapon. I think his 
testimony from that point forward the keys were taken by 
the driver, Mr. Lovegren took them back and he opened the 
trunk. He took the suitcase out and opened the suitcase. 
Then the attitude toward the cookie box was sufficient I 
think to establish a strong suspicion in connection with 
everything else. Transcript of Suppression Hearing, page 
94, lines 4 to 12. 
While the trial court found that Lovegren's actions indicated 
he consented to a search of his trunk and suitcase, the Court 
recognized Lovegren's actions toward the cookie box were different 
and did not evidence consent to a search of it but instead a 
"strong suspicion". The trial court recognized an obvious break in 
the meaning of Lovegren's actions that indicated Lovegren's consent 
did not extend to the box. 
The trial Court erred in concluding that Lovegren consented to 
a search of the trunk and suitcase. The totality of the 
circumstances do not convincingly sustain that Lovegren's words and 
actions evidenced his consent that the trooper could search his car 
or trunk or suitcase. Further, it is uncontroverted that any 
consent given stopped short of the cookie box. Any justification 
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fo .111 / — r • ,n mi,. \\gf} !),)>: must necessarily be founded on an 
exception : the protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures that has not been raised by the State, either on appeal or 
below. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The trial court erred in denying Appellants1 separate motions 
to suppress the evidence seized from their persons, from the 
automobile they occupied, ai id from containers within the 
automobile. This Court should order suppression of all evidence 
seized and remand with instructions to allow Appellants to withdraw 
their conditional no-contest pleas. 
Dated this day of April, 1990. 
Michael D; E^plin x Thomas H. Means 
Attorney for Attorney for 
Gregory W. Southern Robert D. Lovegren 
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